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TAXATION, PREGNANCY, AND PRIVACY
BRIDGET J. CRAWFORD*
ABSTRACT
This Article frames a discussion of surrogacy within the context
of existing income tax laws. A surrogate receives money for carrying
and bearing a child. This payment is income by any definition, even
if the surrogacy contract recites that it is a “reimbursement.” Cases
and rulings on the income tax consequences of the sale of blood and
human breast milk, as well as analogies to situations in which people
are paid to wear advertising on their bodies, support the conclusion
that a surrogate recognizes taxable income, although the Internal
Revenue Service has never stated so. For tax purposes, the repro-
ductive labor of surrogacy is “work.” This Article considers, and then
rebuts, privacy-based objections to a surrogacy tax. Disclosure of in-
come from surrogacy is a reasonable consequence of the freedom to
engage in that activity. The federal government should take steps to
increase tax compliance.
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INTRODUCTION
Donating blood to friends, family members, or even strangers
has social and moral caché. The press heralds the donations as acts
of kindness, generosity and even heroism.1 But selling or renting
one’s body parts or products is another matter entirely. Associating
human organs or bodily fluids with economic value smacks of the
illicit or illegal.2 Yet the sale or donation of body parts occurs with
enough frequency that, on multiple occasions, courts and the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) have addressed the tax consequences of these
transfers.3 Concepts like “income” and “deductions” translate awk-
wardly to the human body, but the government has applied them to
cases involving sales of blood and human breast milk.4
This Article applies basic tax principles to paid pregnancy, more
commonly known as surrogate motherhood. In the traditional form
of surrogacy, a woman contractually agrees to be artificially insem-
inated with sperm of the other party (or a third party donor).5 The
woman also agrees to carry the child to term and relinquish her rights
to the child in favor of the contracting party (and his wife, typically).6
In gestational surrogacy, a surrogate is implanted with an embryo
created from the egg of one of the parties (or a donor) and the sperm
of the other party (or a donor).7 The parties who contract with a tra-
ditional or gestational surrogate typically are called the “intended
parents.” 8 Surrogacy contracts often characterize payments to the
surrogate as reimbursements for living and medical expenses to mini-
mize the likelihood that the contract would violate policies against
1. Margaret Schmidt, Police Officer Marc DiNardo’s Organs to be Donated, JERSEY
J., July 20, 2009, available at http://www.nj.com/hudson/index.ssf/2009/07/police_officer
_marc_dinardos_o.html (quoting a colleague memorializing a thirty-seven-year-old
Jersey City, New Jersey police officer shot while on duty: “Marc was not a selfish man;
he was a moral man, a man who gave of himself to those who could not care for them-
selves. Marc gave his life so others could live by donating organs. He is a true hero.”).
2. See, e.g., Elaine Catz, Exhibition of Exploitation, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, June 24,
2007, at H-1, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/07175/796418-109.stm (question-
ing sources of cadavers displayed in “Bodies . . . the Exhibition,” in light of the fact that
“the Chinese deputy health minister publicly acknowledged that his country has a thriv-
ing illegal organ trade. He also said that most organs transplanted in China are taken
from executed prisoners”); Laurie Goering, Gruesome Harvest in India, CHI. TRIB., Feb.
21, 2008, at 1 (describing India’s illegal organ harvesting rings).
3. See infra Part I.A.1 and accompanying text (discussing the income tax consequences
of the sale of body parts).
4. See infra Part I.A.1 and accompanying text (discussing the income tax consequences
of the sale of body parts).
5. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 117 (Md. 2007).
6. Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough Waters: An Overview
of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 21, 22 (2005).
7. Id.
8. Id.
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baby-selling.9 Nevertheless, the surrogate’s receipts are and should
be taxable income.10
Part I provides an overview of the income tax treatment of two
types of transactions: (A) selling blood and regenerable body parts
and (B) renting the human body as advertising space. This Part con-
siders whether such income should be treated as capital or ordinary
and what deductions might be available under existing tax rules.
Part II analyzes surrogacy contracts and the demographics of the
parties. Part III explains why payments received by a surrogate are
taxable income. This Part argues that surrogates do not uniformly
comply with income tax-reporting requirements and that the federal
government should enforce existing laws. Part IV evaluates and rebuts
privacy-based objections to taxing surrogacy. This Part also argues
that there is no privacy-based justification for failing to enforce a sur-
rogacy tax any more than a tax on the sale of blood. Part V links ques-
tions about taxation and surrogacy to disruptions of traditional family
structures and roles for women. The Article concludes with reflections
on the law’s role in supporting a commercial trade in human bodies.
I. INCOME TAX AND BODIES
A. Blood and Regenerable Body Parts
Giving away one’s body (or body parts) is not unusual in the
United States. At least eight million living people give blood each
year.11 Typically blood donors are not compensated for their dona-
tions,12 although some blood donors seek more than the psychic
9. See Doe v. Att’y Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484, 489 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
entering into a surrogacy contract for “compensation,” defined as a payment of money
or anything having monetary value, except the payment of medical and other expenses
incurred during the pregnancy, is unlawful and prohibited).
10. See infra Part III.A (discussing the income tax treatment of payments received
by a surrogate).
11. American Red Cross, 50 Quick Facts, http://www.givelife2.org/sponsor/quickfacts
.asp#top%20idtop (last visited Sept. 28, 2009) (citing eight million blood donors in the
United States in 2001). As a point of reference, in 2007, there were 10,587 kidneys donated
from deceased donors. Living Donors Online!, Why Living Kidney Donation?, http://www
.livingdonorsonline.org/kidney/kidney2.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2009) (stating further
that approximately 76,000 people were waiting for kidney transplants).
12. See Posting of Melissa Lafsky to Freakonomics Blog, How Much for that Pint
of Blood?, http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/06/04/how-much-for-that-pint-of
-blood/?pagemode=print (June 4, 2007, 11:10 EST) (stating that the Food and Drug
Administration guidelines, which regulate gifts to blood donors, “prohibit[ ] any gifts to
blood donors in excess of twenty-five dollars in cumulative value”). While this strains the
income tax definition of a gift (Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (“[I]f the
payment proceeds primarily from . . . ‘the incentive of anticipated benefit’ . . . it is not a
gift . . . . A gift in the statutory sense . . . proceeds from a ‘detached and disinterested
generosity’ . . . .”)) it appears to be an administrative response to a common practice.
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benefit of helping a person in need. They want a financial benefit,13
too, often in the form of an income tax deduction. The IRS has not
been sympathetic to these claims, reasoning either that blood dona-
tions either are not donations of property susceptible to a charitable
transfer (and therefore the value of the blood is not deductible)14 or
that donating blood is a service (and therefore the value of the ser-
vice is not deductible).15 So potential blood donors who seek financial
gain are better off selling their blood, although this option may be
available only to people with rare blood types,16 and these people will
owe income tax on their receipts.17 Proceeds from the sale of blood
are clearly “income” under the tax laws.18
1. Tax Characterization of Income
Basic tax concepts like gain and loss do not translate easily to
the sale of human body parts or products. For tax purposes, the gain
13. Employees of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts are permitted a paid leave of
absence of up to eight hours per year for donating blood. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.  ch. 149,
§ 33D (West 2009) (“Any employee of the commonwealth, of any county, and of any city
or town which accepts the provisions of this section, shall be allowed a leave of absence
without loss of pay of not more than eight hours in each calendar year for the purpose
of donating platelets, plasma white cells or whole blood to any cancer research center.”).
14. Lary v. United States, 787 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that taxpayers
are not entitled to a tax deduction when donated blood is categorized as a product); Green
v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1229, 1234 (1980) (finding that the sale of plasma was the sale of a
tangible product); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,418 (Sept. 15, 1975) [hereinafter I.R.S.
Gen. Couns. Mem.] (“Milk is property . . . . Under Code § 170(e), the tax result in the
subject case would be the same, recognizing that the donation of mother’s milk is a
contribution of property and not services . . . . Therefore, under Code § 170(e) the
taxpayer is not allowed any deduction for her donation of mother’s milk.”).
15. The value of services rendered to or on behalf of a charity is not deductible. Treas.
Reg. § 1.170A-1(g) (2009). Thus, when an attorney performs pro bono services for a non-
profit organization, she may not deduct the value of her time. See id.; see also Rev. Rul.
162, 1953-1 C.B. 127 (finding that blood donation is a non-deductible service rendered on
behalf of a charity); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem., supra note 14 (citing I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
23,310 (July 6, 1942)) (denying a deduction for blood donation, reversing the prior position
taken by the IRS); Dorothy A. Brown, Contested Commodities: Lessons From Tax Policy,
in 21ST CENTURY LAW (Michele Goodwin ed., forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 4-8)
(discussing the tax treatment of sales and donations of blood). In other contexts, courts
have held that blood is not property. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792, 794-
96 (N.Y. 1954) (holding that blood is not property for purposes of a commercial warranty).
16. See United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1979) (“Because Garber’s
blood is so rare . . . she was approached by other laboratories which lured her away from
Dade Reagents by offering an increasingly attractive price for her plasma.”).
17. See infra Part I.A.1 (discussing the tax treatment of sales of regenerable body
parts).
18. Lary, 787 F.2d at 1540-41 (noting that “profit from the sale of blood does constitute
income within the meaning of I.R.C. § 61”); see I.R.C. § 61(a) (2009) (stating that gross
income includes “all income from whatever source derived”); see also Comm’r v. Glenshaw
Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (describing income as an “undeniable accession[] to
wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion”).
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or loss on the sale or other disposition of property is the excess of the
amount realized over adjusted basis.19 Amount realized is the sum
of money plus the fair market value of other property received.20
Adjusted basis is the amount that a taxpayer has invested in the
property.21 So, when a taxpayer buys a piece of real property for $500,
her cost basis is $500.22 When she makes a capital improvement of
$100, her adjusted basis becomes $600.23 If the property is worth $800
at the time of the sale, and the taxpayer sells the improved property
for this price, her gain is $200. Similarly, if the property is worth
$300 at the time of the sale, and the taxpayer sells the improved (but
less valuable) property for this price, her loss is $300. To apply the
same rules to the disposition of body parts, one must determine the
taxpayer’s basis in the property and the amount for which she sells
it. In the case of human hair, for example, a taxpayer may sell her
long tresses to a commercial wigmaker for $200.24 What is a tax-
payer’s basis in her own hair?25 Is it $200? Zero?26 Some amount in
between? The law is not clear.
After determining the gain or loss on the sale of any property,
one then characterizes it as “ordinary” or “capital” for income tax
purposes.27 A sale of a capital asset results in capital gain or loss.28 A
sale of an ordinary asset results in ordinary gain or loss.29 According
to the income tax definition, all assets are capital, unless specifically
excluded from the definition of capital assets.30 Specifically excluded
is any “copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter
19. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2009).
20. Id. § 1001(b).
21. Id. §§ 1011(a), 1012, 1016.
22. See id. § 1012 (stating that a taxpayer’s unadjusted basis is the cost of the
property).
23. See id. § 1016(a)(1) (stating that capital expenditures are upward adjustments
to the taxpayer’s basis).
24. Sell Yourself for Cash, MSNBC, April 12, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
3949869 (“[I]f you want to sell your hair to a merchant, you’ll get [five] to [ten] dollars
an ounce.”). Recently an eleven-year-old girl offered twelve inches of her red hair for sale
on an internet auction site; the minimum bid was $200. Online Hair Affair, Multi-Tone
Auburn Red Virgin Hair, http://www.onlinehairaffair.com/Multitoned-Auburn-Red-Virgin
-Hair,name,100204,auction_id,auction_details (last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
25. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (2009) (“[F]air market value is the price at which
the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts.”).
26. Dorothy Brown argues that a taxpayer takes a zero basis in her own blood
because the taxpayer has not paid anything for that blood. Brown, supra note 15 (manu-
script at 11-12).
27. 2009 U.S. MASTER TAX GUIDE ¶ 1735 (2008).
28. I.R.C. § 1222 (2009).
29. Id. § 64.
30. Id. § 1221(a).
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or memorandum, or similar property, held by . . . a taxpayer whose
personal efforts created such property, . . . [or] a taxpayer for whom
[a letter, memorandum, or similar property] was prepared or pro-
duced,” or a person whose tax basis in the property is determined by
reference to either of the foregoing.31 Thus an artist’s painting is an
ordinary asset in his own hands, but a capital asset in the hands of
the art aficionado who purchases from a gallery (or even the artist
himself) and holds it for investment purposes.32
So what about the taxpayer who sells her own hair? Is hair some-
thing that the taxpayer has created, like a painting, through her own
effort, or is the hair more like the art aficionado’s investment? The
amount of tax imposed on the gain from the sale of a taxpayer’s hair
will depend on whether the hair is a capital asset or an ordinary asset
for tax purposes.33
Income tax concepts apply awkwardly to the human body. At
least one court has opined that human blood is no different, in a tax
sense, from “hen’s eggs, bee’s honey, cow’s milk, or sheep’s wool for
processing and distribution.” 34 In Green v. Commissioner, the United
States Tax Court held that when a taxpayer makes routine and re-
peated sales of her blood plasma, she is like a business selling its
inventory.35 Inventory is an ordinary asset, so its sale results in ordi-
nary gain or loss.36 The IRS has taken a similar approach to human
breast milk: “Milk is a commodity, whether from a human being or a
cow.” 37 Then the sale of breast milk, too, results in ordinary income,
not capital gains (or losses).38 Presumably the same is true of sperm,
although there do not appear to be any specific statutes, cases, admin-
istrative rulings or guidance indicating as much.39
31. Id. § 1221(a)(3)(A)-(C).
32. See id.
33. See IRS.gov, Tax Topics — Topic 409 Capital Gains and Losses, http://www.irs
.gov/taxtopics/tc409.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2009) (“[I]f you have a net capital gain, that
gain may be taxed at a lower tax rate than the ordinary income tax rates.”).
34. Green v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1229, 1234 (1980).
35. Id. at 1235; see also Int’l Trading Co. v. Comm’r, 275 F.2d 578, 584 (7th Cir. 1960)
(pointing out that the determination of whether a taxpayer has been carrying on a trade
or business is fact-specific, with factors such as profit motive and business-like policies
carrying weight); Doggett v. Burnet, 65 F.2d 191, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1933) (holding that, in de-
ciding whether the taxpayer has carried on a trade or business, the court should look at
“whether or not the person engaged in a legitimate enterprise” and “show[ed] a willingness
to invest time and capital on the future outcome of the enterprise”); Gentile v. Comm’r, 65
T.C. 1, 4, 6 (1975) (noting that gambling has elements of carrying on a trade or business).
36. I.R.C. §§ 64, 65 (2009).
37. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem., supra note 14.
38. Id.
39. The IRS does not seem to have addressed the direct question of whether receipts
from sperm donations are taxable income, but by analogy to the blood cases, they almost
certainly are. See I.R.C. § 61 (2009) (“[G]ross income means all income from whatever
source derived . . . .”); U.S. Income Portfolios: Real Estate, Tax & Accounting Center
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If replenishable bodily fluids, like blood plasma and breast milk,
are ordinary assets for income tax purposes, do all transactions involv-
ing cash for body parts result in ordinary income? Some body parts,
like kidneys, lungs or parts of livers, should not be treated as com-
modities because they are not replenishable.40 A living person can
sell or donate only one kidney or one lung and continue to live.41 By
any definition, these human organs are not assets held primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of business,42 suggesting
that they are capital in nature.43 Yet the taxpayer has not made any
investment in a tax sense in these organs, or at least the taxpayer
has made no investment in her organs that is different than an in-
vestment in life generally (such as paying for food, water, shelter).44
Because the tax law is so ill-equipped to address commercial dealings
involving the human body, one gropes for apt (if inelegant or even
offensive) analogies.
2. Deductions from Income
A taxpayer who sells enough blood plasma or breast milk with
enough frequency will be treated, for income tax purposes, as being
(BNA) No. 561-2nd, at III(C)(3) (2009) [hereinafter U.S. Income Portfolios: Real Estate]
(discussing whether certain human body parts are capital assets). An eligible man may
sell his sperm for between twenty-five dollars and one hundred dollars per deposit.
Machelle M. Seibel & Ann Kiessling, Compensating Egg Donors: Equal Pay for Equal
Time?, in FAMILY BUILDING THROUGH EGG AND SPERM DONATION 26 (Machelle M. Seibel
& Susan L. Crockin eds. 1996); LISA JEAN MOORE, SPERM COUNTS: OVERCOME BY MAN’S
MOST PRECIOUS FLUID 104 (2007).
40. Brown, supra note 15 (manuscript at 12) (“Unlike Margaret Green who was in
the business of selling her blood, a one-time sale of a kidney that goes to the highest
bidder would generally not be considered as property held primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of a trade or business.”). In a different context, several authors
make a distinction between the commodification of a “replenishable” bodily fluid or part
(such as blood, sperm or hair) and a non-replenishable part (such as a kidney). See, e.g.,
Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards a Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 2001
BYU L. REV. 107, 128 (2001) (discussing the ban on the sale of organs and nonreplenish-
able tissues and arguing that the sale of replenishable parts should not be banned);
Mark F. Grady, Politicization of Commodities: The Case of Cadaveric Organs, 20 J.
CORP. L. 51, 60 (1994) (pointing out that commentators fear that sale of nonreplenishable
organs affronts human dignity).
41. OrganDonor.gov, Types of Donation, http://www.organdonor.gov/donation/typesof
donation.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
42. See Mauldin v. Comm’r, 195 F.2d 714, 716 (10th Cir. 1952) (“There is no fixed
formula or rule of thumb for determining whether property sold by the taxpayer was held
by him primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.
Each case must, in the last analysis, rest upon its own facts. There are a number of
helpful factors, however, to point the way, among which are the purposes for which the
property was acquired, whether for sale or investment; and continuity and frequency of
sales as opposed to isolated transactions.”).
43. I.R.C. § 1221 (2009) (stating that capital assets do not “include property held by
a taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business”).
44. See id. § 262 (disallowing deductions for various personal expenses).
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in the business of selling these fluids.45 Generally speaking, under
I.R.C. § 162, a deduction is allowed for all “ordinary and necessary ex-
penses paid or incurred . . . in carrying on any trade or business.” 46
In Green, the blood plasma case, the United States Tax Court per-
mitted the taxpayer to deduct the cost of specialty foods and vitamins
and for transportation to and from the lab where she gave blood.47
Presumably, similar deductions would be permitted for a breast milk
seller. By extension, a taxpayer who derives the majority of her in-
come from frequent sales of her own hair is likely to be in the business
of selling hair, for income tax purposes, and entitled to deductions for
her “ordinary and necessary” business expenses.48 This might mean
that the cost of shampoo, conditioners, special hair treatments, pro-
fessional blow-drying, and the like would be deductible.
The Green case does not necessarily suggest, however, that courts
will permit broad deductions for taxpayers engaged in the business
of selling their own bodily products.49 After allowing the taxpayer’s
claimed deductions for specialty food and travel to the lab, the Green
court denied two further claimed deductions.50 First, the court re-
jected a business deduction for the cost of the taxpayer’s health in-
surance.51 The court said: “Although petitioner attempts to justify the
deduction by comparing her body to some insured manufacturing
machinery, the instant set of facts prevents such a comparison; her
body is not a replaceable, or easily repairable, machine maintained
solely for the production of blood plasma.” 52 Furthermore, maintain-
ing health insurance, according to the court, was “primarily a per-
sonal concern, not merely a business concern.” 53
Next the court rejected a claimed depletion deduction for the loss
of mineral content in the taxpayer’s body as a result of her plasma
donations.54 Under I.R.C. § 611, a taxpayer is allowed to deduct a cer-
tain percentage of either his original investment or his sales revenue
from mines, oil, gas wells, similar natural deposits, and timber.55 The
Green court reasoned that the clear legislative history permitted the
depletion allowance for natural, geological or soil-based deposits,
45. Green v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1229, 1235 (1980); Mauldin, 195 F.2d at 716.
46. I.R.C. § 162 (2009).
47. Green, 74 T.C. at 1236-38.
48. I.R.C. § 162 (2009).
49. See Green, 74 T.C. at 1235 (holding that a determination of allowable deductions
is fact-specific and must be substantiated).
50. Id. at 1235, 1238.
51. Id. at 1235.
52. Id. at 1235-36.
53. Id. at 1236.
54. Id. at 1238.
55. I.R.C. § 611 (2009).
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but not for the minerals of the human body.56 Thus, it is extremely
unlikely that the IRS or the courts would take an expansive approach
to deductions for, say, depreciation of “property used in the trade or
business” under I.R.C. § 167.57 For tax purposes, one can be in the
business of selling one’s body, but one’s body is no ordinary business.
Charitable deductions for the donation of body parts almost cer-
tainly are disallowed; the IRS has already made this clear with respect
to blood donations.58 Talk show host Jimmy Kimmel famously offered
to buy the kidney stone of actor William Shatner of Star Trek fame.59
If Mr. Shatner had sold the kidney stone to Mr. Kimmel, Shatner
would have had to recognize income.60 So when Mr. Shatner sold the
kidney stone to a business in return for the business’s promise to
donate the purchase price to Habitat for Humanity, a well-known
charity,61 then under the I.R.C., Mr. Shatner is deemed for income
tax purposes to receive $25,000.62 As the constructive transferor of
the $25,000, he might also be eligible for a charitable contribution de-
duction under I.R.C. § 170(c).63 But had Mr. Shatner transferred the
kidney stone directly to Habitat for Humanity, he would not be per-
mitted to take a deduction, either because the IRS would deem him
to be providing a “service” to the charity, or on the grounds that the
kidney stone was not “property” susceptible to a charitable transfer.64
56. Green, 74 T.C. at 1238 (“Congress enacted sections 611 to 614 and their prede-
cessors to promote exploration and development of geological mineral resources.”).
57. I.R.C. § 167 (2009).
58. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text (discussing the tax treatment of
blood donations as charitable contributions).
59. Jimmy Kimmel Live: William Shatner Interview (ABC television broadcast Nov. 14,
2005), available at http://vrrrm.com/tv/Kimmel/05/ShatnerKimmel51114.php. Kimmel
proclaimed the kidney stone “the ultimate ‘Star Trek’ collectible.” Id.
60. I.R.C. § 61 (2009) (“[G]ross income means all income from whatever source
derived . . . .”).
61. Press Release, Send2Press Newswire, William Shatner Passes Kidney Stone Off
to GoldenPalace.com for $25,000 (Jan. 18, 2006) (http://www.send2press.com/newswire/
2006-01-0118-001.shtml) [hereinafter Shatner Press Release].
62. I.R.C. §§ 63, 64, 170(c) (2009). For the reasons that Mr. Shatner is treated as the
income tax “owner” of the $25,000, see Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930) (stating
famously that “no distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the arrange-
ment by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew”);
Comm’r v. Giannini, 129 F.2d 638, 640-41 (1942) (finding that the taxpayer with control
of the funds realizes taxable income, even if he assigns it to someone else).
63. I.R.C. § 170(c) (2009). His actual deduction would be limited to applicable limits
on “excess” charitable contributions. Id. § 170(d).
64. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the tax treatment of chari-
table contributions); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUBL’N
NO. 526, CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS tbl.1 (2008) (listing the value of time or services
and the value of donated blood as nondeductible); U.S. Income Portfolios: Real Estate,
supra note 39, at III.C(7) (“It would seem that current law generally supports capital
gain treatment for the sale or transfer of human body parts. The service aspect of the
transfer would have no meaning without the body part.”).
336 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 16:327
B. Body Rentals
Newspapers are full of strange accounts of commercial transac-
tions involving the human body. Consider three situations in which
members of the public agreed to wear temporary tattoos or stickers
on their bodies in return for compensation. The first well-publicized
contemporary case arose in 2005, when student Andrew Fisher auc-
tioned his forehead space on eBay.65 The highest bidder, a snoring pill
company, paid Mr. Fisher $37,375 to wear its advertisement embla-
zoned on his face.66 Several people also agreed to shave their heads
and display temporary tattoos advertising Air New Zealand in re-
turn for airline tickets worth $1200.67 One online beauty products
purveyor, FeelUnique.com, paid people to affix temporary stickers to
their eyelids.68 The company then paid the sticker-bearers for wink-
ing at others.69 In each of these three cases — the forehead billboard,
the shaved heads and the decorated eyelids — the recipient recog-
nizes taxable income that he or she must report.70 It makes no differ-
ence whether the taxpayers’ actions constitute the rental of a body
part (the forehead or the shaved skull) or the performance of a service
(winking stickered eyes).71 In each case, the taxpayer receives income
on a one-time basis.72 Because of the temporary nature of the adver-
tising and the singular payment, none of these taxpayers likely could
claim successfully that they were in the “business” of advertising.73
Consider whether a person who agrees to a permanent body
tattoo in return for payment is differently situated. Kari Smith of
Bountiful, Utah received $10,000 from Golden Palace Online Casino
to permanently tattoo the company’s name on her forehead.74 Ms.
Smith’s case is different from the others because the advertising she
65. CBS Evening News: Latest Advertising Fad of Placing Ads on People’s Bodies
(CBS television broadcast May 13, 2005). Similarly, Amber Rainey auctioned advertising
space on her pregnant torso for $4000. Id.
66. Id.
67. Andrew Adam Newman, The Body as Billboard: Your Ad Here, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 18, 2009, at B3; see also Steve Creedy, Shorthaul, AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 12, 2008, at 36
(discussing Air New Zealand’s ad campaign); Robert Kahn, Turning (and Shaving) Heads,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 20, 2009, at A13 (same).
68. Newman, supra note 67.
69. Id.
70. I.R.C. §§ 61 (2009) (noting that gross income includes “[c]ompensation for services”).
71. Id.
72. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
73. See Mauldin v. Comm’r, 195 F.2d 714, 716 (10th Cir. 1952) (noting that relevant
to characterization are purposes for which property acquired and “continuity and
frequency of sales”).
74. Newman, supra note 67. Note that GoldenPalace.com is the same company that
bought William Shatner’s kidney stone. See Shatner Press Release, supra note 61.
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wears is permanent, but similar in that she received a one-time pay-
ment. Arguably she is in a better (although far from certain) position
to argue that she is engaged in the day-to-day business of advertising.
If that is true, then one would expect that she would be eligible for
deductions under IRC § 162 for the costs of carrying on her business
of advertising.75 Recall that in the case of the frequent plasma donor,
the court allowed a deduction for the cost of specialty foods, vita-
mins, and transportation to and from the medical lab.76 So might the
wearer of a permanent forehead tattoo be able to deduct the cost of
food? After all, one cannot continue to operate the body as a billboard
unless the body receives nourishment. Might she be able to deduct the
cost of her transportation to a busy public place? One cannot advertise
what is on one’s forehead by staying at home. It is unlikely, however,
that the IRS would allow any business deductions for these expenses
of a permanent tattoo wearer, probably because they are personal in
nature.77 One must eat anyway; one must travel for work, school, and
commerce anyway, regardless of what is on one’s forehead. Just as
the court in Green rejected the body-as-machine argument for pur-
poses of the business deduction,78 it also likely would reject deductions
claimed for a body-as-billboard business.
II. SELLING OR RENTING REPRODUCTION
A. Overview of Surrogacy
Against the backdrop of cases involving the sale of one’s bodily
fluids and the rental of bodies for advertising space, consider an
arrangement between a woman (typically called the surrogate) and
another party or parties (typically called the intended parent or
parents).79 The surrogate agrees to carry a fertilized embryo, give birth
to a child and relinquish all legal claims to the child in favor of the in-
tended parents.80 The surrogate typically receives reimbursement for
her medical expenses and may or may not receive an additional fee.81
75. See I.R.C. § 162 (2009) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred . . . in carrying on any trade or business . . . .”).
76. Green v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1229, 1230, 1237-38 (1980).
77. See I.R.C. § 262 (2009) (“[N]o deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or
family expenses.”).
78. Green, 74 T.C. at 1235-36.
79. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 6, at 22.
80. Id.
81. Surrogacy Contracts: The Essentials of a Good Surrogacy Agreement, http://www
.allaboutsurrogacy.com/contracts.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2009) (listing the various
expenses and fees that a surrogate might request).
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The surrogate may be a relative, friend, or stranger with respect to
the intended parent or parents.82
Early surrogacy arrangements typically involved a hired third-
party surrogate who agreed to have her own egg fertilized in vitro
with the sperm of the intended father.83 The surrogate, sometimes
called a “genetic” or “traditional” surrogate, carried and gave birth to
her own child.84 The surrogate then relinquished her parental rights
in favor of the child’s genetic father; she permitted the child to be
adopted by the genetic father’s wife.85
Traditional surrogacy drew national attention in the dramatic
case of In re Baby M.86 In 1985, Mary Beth Whitehead agreed to be
artificially inseminated with the sperm of Richard Stern.87 The parties
agreed in writing that at the conclusion of a successful pregnancy,
Mrs. Whitehead would terminate her parental rights and deliver the
child to Mr. Stern and his wife, Elizabeth.88 Mr. Stern was to pay
Mrs. Whitehead $10,000.89 After the baby was born, Mrs. Whitehead
changed her mind.90 She initially relinquished the child but pled to
have the child with her for one week.91 Mrs. Whitehead then refused
to return the child to the Sterns and fled from New Jersey to Florida
with the baby.92
After a long trial, the lower court upheld the validity of the sur-
rogacy contract, awarded custody of the child to Mr. Stern, and per-
mitted Mrs. Stern to adopt the child.93 On appeal, the New Jersey
Supreme Court invalidated the surrogacy contract.94 The Court rea-
soned that the contract violated state prohibitions on paid adoptions,
standard procedures for termination of parental rights, and the fun-
damental right to revoke a private placement adoption.95 The Court
further noted:
Worst of all, however, is the contract’s total disregard of the
best interests of the child. There is not the slightest suggestion
82. R.J. Edelmann, Surrogacy: The Psychological Issues, 22 J. REPROD. & INFANT
PSYCHOL. 123, 124 (2004).
83. In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128, 1137 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), rev’d in part,
537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
84. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 6, at 22.
85. In re Baby M, 525 A.2d at 1137.
86. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 6, at 21.
87. In re Baby M, 525 A.2d at 1143.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1144.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1145.
93. Id. at 1175.
94. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988).
95. Id.
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that any inquiry will be made at any time to determine the fitness
of the Sterns as custodial parents, of Mrs. Stern as an adoptive
parent, their superiority to Mrs. Whitehead, or the effect on the
child of not living with her natural mother.
This is the sale of a child, or, at the very least, the sale of a
mother’s right to her child, the only mitigating factor being that
one of the purchasers is the father. Almost every evil that
prompted the prohibition on the payment of money in connection
with adoptions exists here.96
The court awarded custody to Mr. Stern and remanded the case
for a determination of Mrs. Whitehead’s visitation rights,97 which the
lower court granted.98 In its decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court
carefully noted the bounds of its decision: In re Baby M had no appli-
cation to a case where the surrogate is unpaid and retains the ability
to change her mind after the birth of the child.99 The New Jersey
Supreme Court called on the state legislature “to focus on the overall
implications of the new reproductive biotechnology — in vitro fertili-
zation, preservation of sperm and eggs, embryo implantation and the
like. The problem is how to enjoy the benefits of the technology — espe-
cially for infertile couples — while minimizing the risk of abuse.”100
In reality, individuals and their doctors responded faster than state
legislators could, using new reproductive biology to avoid, or at least
obscure, some of the concerns of the In re Baby M court.101
In the post-In re Baby M era, genetic or traditional surrogacy is
less common.102 Negative publicity in that case, combined with ad-
vances in reproductive technology, make gestational surrogacy the
most common form of surrogacy.103 Gestational surrogacy involves
96. Id. at 1248.
97. Id. at 1263.
98. In re Baby M, 542 A.2d 52, 53 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988) (granting Stern
custody but finding that the baby’s interests would be served by “unsupervised, uninter-
rupted, liberal visitation” with Whitehead).
99. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1264.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification 14
(Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper, Paper No. 08153, 2008),
available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1045&context=columbia_pllt
(noting that improvements in IVF and gestational surrogacy have “largely replaced tradi-
tional surrogacy” and these “new arrangements have proved to be . . . more palatable to
lawmakers and the public”).
102. Id. at 16 (noting that “gestational surrogacy contracts have become standard”).
103. See id. at 14 (noting that “the new arrangements have proved to be . . . more palat-
able to law makers and the public”). From 1988 to 1994, “the practice of gestational sur-
rogacy increased in the United States at a rather remarkable rate, from less than five
per cent [sic] of all surrogate arrangements to approximately [fifty] per cent [sic] as of
1992.” Heléna Ragoné, The Gift of Life: Surrogate Motherhood, Gamete Donation and
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an egg donor, a carrier and at least one intended parent.104 The
intended parent(s) might be the source of either, both, or neither of
the egg and sperm.105 Gestational surrogacy might be used when a
single man or a male couple wishes to have a child,106 or where a
woman wishes to have a child but she has no viable eggs and/or is
unable to carry a child.107 Usually the egg donor and surrogate are
strangers to each other and to the intended parent(s),108 and thus the
surrogate has no genetic relationship to the child.109
B. Surrogate Census
There are no records of the number of surrogate births in the
United States each year.110 Neither the states nor the federal govern-
ment keeps records of how many surrogates there are, or who acts as
a surrogate.111 The best data comes from reports by member fertility
clinics to the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART).112
However, even SART’s data are not particularly accurate, because
many fertility clinics do not report to SART.113 Furthermore, not all
surrogates use fertility clinics.114 For example, some may choose to
work with their own doctors.115 Informed estimates place the number
of surrogate births in the United States at anywhere from 400 to
Constructions of Altruism, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
209, 211 (Rachel Cook et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter Ragoné, The Gift of Life].
104. AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION: A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS
13 (2006), http://www.asrm.org/Patients/patientbooklets/thirdparty.pdf.
105. Id. (defining gestational surrogacy as when “the surrogate carries a pregnancy
created by transferring an embryo created with sperm and egg of intended parents” but
also noting that “donor sperm can be used as well”).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Edelmann, supra note 82, at 129.
109. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 6, at 22.
110. The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 requires clinics to
report statistics on in vitro fertilizations and resulting births, but does not require spe-
cific reporting on surrogates. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1(a) (2006). For an overview of the model
proposed by the Department of Health and Human Services for certification of certain
laboratory procedures in order to facilitate public awareness of infertility services and
to monitor the quality of those services, see Implementation of the Fertility Clinic
Success Rate Certification Act of 1992, 63 Fed. Reg. 60,178 (1998).
111. See § 263a-1 (requiring that assisted reproductive technology programs report
pregnancy success rates, with no mention of reporting of details about surrogates or
intended parents).
112. Lorraine Ali & Raina Kelley, The Curious Lives of Surrogates, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 7,
2008, at 45, 47.
113. Id.
114. Id. (noting that statistics vary because “[p]rivate agreements made outside an
agency aren’t counted”).
115. Id.
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1000 per year.116 Based on information reported to the government
by fertility clinics, in 2005 there were 134,260 in vitro fertilizations
and related procedures, resulting in the births of 52,041 children.117
Less than one percent of all of these technologies involved the use
of a gestational carrier.118
Surrogacy, like abortion, is a controversial topic in the United
States.119 Yet for all of the controversy surrogacy has engendered,120
there are few empirical studies of surrogates or those who turn to
them.121 Five separate studies found that most surrogate mothers are
married Caucasians between the ages of twenty and forty who have
children already.122 They tend to be Christian and come from working-
class backgrounds.123 Women of color are underrepresented in the sur-
rogate population and the intended parent population, relative to their
percentage of the general population.124 Thus, the prediction that sur-
rogates will be young, single racial minorities125 seems to be incorrect.
116. Id. (giving the “high end” of estimates by “industry experts” as 1000 births to sur-
rogates in 2007); Sara Rimer, No, the Stork Didn’t Bring You, But Mom and Dad Had
Help, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2009, at A1 (noting that advocacy groups estimate that the
number of births from reproductive technology is “much higher” than the American
Society for Reproductive Medicine’s estimate of 400 to 600 per year).
117. Victoria Clay Wright et al., Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance —
United States, 2005, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, June 2008, at 1,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5705a1.htm.
118. Id. at 3.
119. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 6, at 23; see also KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION
AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 1-2 (1984) (discussing abortion).
120. See Scott, supra note 101, at 3 (asking of In re Baby M, “why did the case gen-
erate such powerful emotional, ideological and politic responses that, institutionalized
through legislation, continue to define the law in many states?”).
121. See Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 6, at 23 (highlighting the lack of knowledge
about surrogates and the intended parents who rely on them). Ciccarelli and Beckman
suggest several reasons for this absence: (1) lack of research funding because the issue
is controversial; (2) conflict with the prevailing political party’s policies; (3) surrogate
births comprise a relatively low percentage of all births; (4) fear on the part of the intended
parents or the gestational carrier of social stigma; (5) professional and ethical constraints
on lawyers, psychologists and others who work with surrogates. Id. at 23-24. Table 1:
Studies on Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy cites the only empirical studies of surrogates
and intended parents published between January 1983 and December 2003. Id. at tbl.
122. Id. at 30-31.
123. Id. at 31.
124. Id.; see Jan Hoffman, Egg Donations Meet a Need and Raise Ethical Questions,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1996, at 1 (noting the lack of Asian and Jewish egg donors).
125. BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY
IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 237 (1989); Ruth Macklin, Is There Anything Wrong With
Surrogate Motherhood: An Ethical Analysis, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 57, 60-63 (1988).
The fact that women of color in the United States are not being exploited more than
other women does not mean that exploitation does not occur. Richard F. Storrow, The
Handmaid’s Tale of Fertility Tourism: Passports and Third Parties in the Religious
Regulation of Assisted Conception, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 189, 203 (2005). Certainly,
the woman most likely to engage in surrogacy will be someone who would derive a
marginal benefit from the income. Id. Furthermore, women in other nations are being
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Surrogacy agencies themselves act as gatekeepers to the surro-
gate population.126 One agency, the Center for Surrogate Parenting,
Inc., posts online guidance for prospective surrogates, stating that
they must be (1) a permanent United States resident (in other words,
a citizen or green-card holder); (2) a non-smoker; (3) twenty-one to
forty-two years old (unless the applicant has been a surrogate before,
in which case the surrogate can be older); (4) not a recipient of any
public assistance (such as food stamps, public housing and the like);
and (5) a mother of a child being raised by the applicant.127 Other
agencies have online pre-screening guidelines similar to those of the
Center for Surrogate Parenting, Inc.128 Thus, these are typical agency
policies that shape the surrogate demographic.
If there are few studies of surrogate mother demographics, there
are even fewer studies of intended parents.129 Intended parents skew
wealthy, with one study finding their average household income to
be over $100,000.130 Given how expensive surrogacy is, this informa-
tion is not surprising.131 Indeed, the unavailability of reproductive
technology to middle- and lower-income people is a concern for those
who consider access to reproductive health services to be a basic
asked to have their bodies used as a source of eggs or gestation. Id. It is not uncommon,
for example, for infertile couples to go to a surrogate in India who charges less than a
surrogate in Europe or America. Silvia Spring, The Trade in Fertility, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 12,
2006, http://www.newsweek.com/id/46542. Intended parents from the United States may
go to foreign countries seeking a surrogate who will charge less than a United States-
based surrogate, so the potential hazard of colonization remains. See Storrow, supra
(“[I]nfertility, wealth, and religious dogma . . . can engender a system wherein the
infertile act as colonists laying claim to the resources of disenfranchised groups.”).
126. See Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 6, at 31 (“[I]t is likely that surrogate demo-
graphics are due, at least in part, to the screening which is utilized by surrogacy agencies
in selecting candidates to be surrogates.”).
127. Center For Surrogate Parenting, Inc., Surrogate Mother Application Request,
http://www.creatingfamilies.com/SM/SM_app_request.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2009).
128. See, e.g., Circle Surrogacy, Surrogate Questionnaire, http://www.circlesurrogacy
.com/questionnaire/fillsurvey.php?sid=3 (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (including questions
about prior medical history and drug use); Growing Generations, Surrogate Application,
http://www.growinggenerations.com/ (hover mouse over “Surrogacy Program” hyperlink;
follow “Become a Surrogate” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (including questions
about prior sexual history); An Eggceptional Match LLC, Qualifications of a Gestational
Carrier, http://www.donatedeggs.com/surrogacy/gc-qualificatons.html (last visited Sept. 29,
2009) (delineating qualifications to be a surrogate).
129. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 6, at 24 (noting that there are only twenty-
seven studies that “directly studied characteristics and interaction patterns” of surrogate
mothers and intended parents).
130. HELENA RAGONÉ, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: CONCEPTION IN THE HEART 91 (1994).
131. Surrogates receive somewhere between $20,000 and $25,000 for carrying and
delivering a child. Ali & Kelley, supra note 112, at 45. The intended parents’ total expenses
can run up to $120,000, including medical, legal and other fees. Id. at 47.
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right.132 Curiously overlooked in discussions, studies, and inquiries,
however, is a more basic economic question: how do surrogates treat
the payments they receive for carrying a child?133 Do they declare and
pay income taxes on it? If not, why not? The next Part explores the
answers to these questions.
III. SURROGACY TAX
A. Payments Received by a Surrogate are Taxable Income
Paid surrogates — women who carry a child to term for another —
recognize taxable income.134 Whether that is income from a service,
income from dealings in property, or “rental” income does not change
the fundamental tax result.135 Some surrogacy contracts peg the
amounts a surrogate receives to stated reimbursements for housing,
food, or clothing.136 This is to minimize the likelihood that the con-
tract will be voided, in states that otherwise permit surrogacy, on the
grounds that the contract violates a prohibition on baby-selling.137
Under I.R.C. § 61, gross income includes “all income from whatever
source derived . . . .”138 Income may be realized “in any form, whether
in money, property or services. Income may be realized . . . in the
form of services, meals, accommodations, stock, or other property, as
132. See Macklin, supra note 125, at 60 (analogizing that if women have the right to
reproductive freedoms, such as the “right to abortion or to control the number and spacing
of . . . children,” perhaps they also have the right to serve as a surrogate).
133. Anthony C. Infanti, Dismembering Families 13 (Univ. Pittsburgh Legal Studies
Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. 11, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1374492#.
134. For a prescient discussion of the income tax consequences of surrogacy, see James
Edward Maule, Federal Tax Consequences of Surrogate Motherhood, 60 TAXES: THE TAX
MAGAZINE 656, 657 (1982). Professor Maule explains, “Unquestionably, the fee paid to
the surrogate mother by the childless couple is gross income to the surrogate mother.”
Id. at 657.
135. But see id. at 657 (“Whether that fee constitutes compensation or rental income
is arguable.”).
136. See, e.g., Sample Gestational Surrogate Surrogacy Agreement, http://www.allabout
surrogacy.com/sample_contracts/GScontract1.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (explaining
that examples of expenses to be paid to a surrogate “include, but are not limited to,
housing, automobile, related insurances for housing and automobile, real estate taxes,
and maternity clothing”).
137. Under Ohio law, for example, gestational surrogacy contracts are enforceable, but
the court did not address whether traditional surrogacy contracts are. J.F. v. D.B., 116
Ohio St. 3d 363, 2007-Ohio-6750, 879 N.E.2d 740, at ¶ 6. In the adoption context, Ohio
prohibits the payment of expenses for anything other than physician expenses, hospital
expenses, attorney fees, adoption agency fees, fees for the minor’s medical care, guardian
ad litem fees, foster care expenses, court expenses, and a birth mother’s living expenses
up to $3000. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.055(c) (West Supp. 2009).
138. I.R.C. § 61 (2009).
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well as in cash.”139 The surrogate receives payment for carrying and
bearing a child.140 It is true that many surrogates report altruistic
motives.141 The desire to help another couple have a child is undoubt-
edly heart-felt.142 And many intended parents develop feelings of true
affection for the surrogate.143 The truth remains, however, that but
for the surrogate’s agreement to carry the child, the intended parents
would not pay the surrogate.144 That is income by any definition.145
A woman’s decision to have a child, whether or not that child is
genetically related to her, is a deeply personal — and, for some people,
a religious — choice.146 From moral and ethical standpoints, there
may be a world of difference between a surrogate and someone who
agrees to wear an advertising tattoo.147 But from a purely economic
perspective, there is no difference. Both taxpayers put their bodies
to an agreed-upon use and receive compensation for “work” (whether
advertising or gestating).148 The gestational surrogate has no more
claim to an exclusion from income than does the woman with the fore-
head tattoo.149 It is possible that, depending on the facts of a particular
139. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (2009).
140. Barbara L. Atwell, Surrogacy and Adoption: A Case of Incompatibility, 20 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988).
141. See Scott, supra note 101, at 2 (“[N]ews stories about surrogacy arrangements in
the past decade have tended to be upbeat human interest tales describing warm relation-
ships between surrogates and the couples for whom they bear children . . . .”).
142. See, e.g., M. M. Tieu, Altruistic Surrogacy: The Necessary Objectification of
Surrogate Mothers, 35 J. MED. ETHICS 171, 171 (2009) (explaining surrogate mothers’
altruistic motives for bearing children); Olga van den Akker, Genetic and Gestational
Surrogate Mothers’ Experience of Surrogacy, 21 J. REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOL. 145, 146,
150 (2003) (reporting that the majority of British surrogates surveyed said that they did
it for altruistic reasons, that most reported they enjoyed pregnancy and childbirth, and
that many surrogates said surrogacy fulfilled or added something to their lives).
143. van den Akker, supra note 142, at 146 (describing that many surrogates testified
to the “deep and meaningful friendships” they had developed with the intended parents).
144. See Atwell, supra note 140, at 45 (advancing the argument that the intended
parents pay for the surrogate’s services rather than the baby).
145. See supra Part I.B (describing commercial transactions involving the human body
and their tax consequences).
146. See, e.g., United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH 532 (Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2nd ed. 2000) (1997) (“The conjugal
community is established upon the consent of the spouses. Marriage and the family are
ordered to the good of the spouse and to the procreation and education of children. The love
of the spouses and the begetting of children create among members of the same family
personal relationships and primordial responsibilities.”); see also DAVID M. FELDMAN, BIRTH
CONTROL IN JEWISH LAW 30 (1968) (“Mishnah: A man may not desist from the duty of
procreation unless he already has children.”).
147. See supra Part I.B (discussing commercial transactions involving the human body).
148. See supra notes 65-75, 140 and accompanying text (pointing out that both taxpayers
who rent their bodies as advertising space and those who act as surrogates receive
payment for their services).
149. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (refuting the suggestion that deduc-
tions are available for body advertisement expenses).
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case, the IRS might be willing to permit certain offsetting deductions
to the surrogate that it otherwise disallows to the wearer of the fore-
head tattoo.
What kind of deductions might a surrogate be eligible to take?
If a surrogate engages in enough gestation (or, rather, in gestation
often enough), it is possible that she could be deemed to be engaging
in the “trade or business” of gestation, such that she would be able
to deduct her gestation-related expenses under I.R.C. § 162 (business
deductions) or I.R.C. § 195 (for “start-up” expenses).150 If the surro-
gate is not in the “business” of gestation, it is possible that she could
be deemed to be engaged in the “hobby” of gestation — that is, an
activity not engaged in for profit — thereby entitling her to limited
income tax deductions.151
B. Surrogacy Tax Enforcement
From a tax perspective, the difficult question to answer is not
how much taxable income surrogates recognize, but whether they
report that income. If they do not, why not? If they do not, what does
(or should) the federal government do about the non-compliance?
It is not possible to determine with certainty whether surro-
gates report their income.152 The IRS does not ask on Form 1040,
U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, whether the taxpayer has re-
ceived any income from surrogacy.153 The form, however, does ask
150. For an engaged and thorough discussion of possible deductions available to a surro-
gate, see Sarah B. Lawsky, Baby Tax 8-10 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
151. I.R.C. § 183(b) (2009) (providing for deductions for activities not engaged in for
profit). The phrase “activity not engaged in for profit” means any activity other than one
for which business deductions are allowed under I.R.C. § 162 and other than expenses
associated with the production or collection of income under I.R.C. § 212. Id. § 183(c); see
also U.S. Income Portfolios: Income Deductions, Credits, and Computations of Tax, Tax
& Accounting Center, (BNA) No. 541-1st, at I(A) (describing the “operation of the § 183
‘hobby loss’ rule”); 34 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Taxation ¶ 17480 (2009) (listing factors to con-
sider in determining whether an activity is engaged in for profit). A more unusual deduc-
tion would be for “qualified creative expenses” under I.R.C. § 263A(h). A person who is
in the business of being a writer, photographer or artist need not comply with the capital-
ization rules for inventory. I.R.C. § 263A(h) (2009). Is creating a human life analogous for
tax purposes creating an artwork? If an artist has a zero basis in her art, does she have
a zero basis in her blood? A child she gestates? Even asking these questions is certain
to offend someone.
152. Income Tax Issues in Surrogacy, http://www.information-on-surrogacy.com/tax
-issues.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2009) (stating that many surrogates have contacted the
IRS to ask if they should pay income tax on their surrogacy compensation, but that the
IRS has given no uniform answer).
153. See Internal Revenue Service, Dep’t of the Treasury, Form 1040 (2008) (lacking any
mention of surrogacy).
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the taxpayer to report any wages, salaries, tips,154 business income,155
and “other” income.156 The IRS could compile data on the number of
taxpayers who report payments received from a particular payor (a
named surrogacy agency) or a group of payors (all known surrogacy
agencies). The IRS has never done so, however, and it is quite un-
likely that it ever will because of budgetary constraints.157 Because
no tax data are available, the researcher must look to other sources.
In the case of surrogacy, however, there is no accurate count of the
number of surrogate births each year,158 let alone the tax positions
taken by surrogates. Academic studies of surrogates have focused on
their demographic or psychological characteristics, not their income
tax reporting practices.159 One must turn instead to the surrogates
themselves. They already have turned to the internet.160
Postings by experienced or potential surrogates to publicly-
accessible internet discussion boards tend to indicate three differ-
ent conclusions: (1) not all surrogates understand that their receipts
are taxable income;161 (2) those surrogates who do understand that
their receipts are taxable income reject that characterization;162 and
154. Id. at l. 7.
155. Id. at l. 12.
156. Id. at l. 21.
157. See, e.g., Jacki Calmes, Obama Will Propose Cuts of $17 Billion From Budget,
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2009, at A22 (“The savings for the budget year starting Oct. 1 represent
the sum of Mr. Obama’s promised ‘line by line’ scrubbing of the federal budget.”); David
Cay Johnson, I.R.S. to Close Walk-In Centers as Agency Faces Tighter Budget, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 10, 2005, at 20 (reporting that in 2004, the agency hired no tax collectors and does
not hire revenue agents at rate to keep pace with retirements); Stephen Ohlemacher, IG:
IRS Does Poor Job Regulating Tax Preparers, ASSOCIATED PRESS FIN. WIRE, July 20, 2009
(describing the inability of the IRS to track, monitor, or control tax preparers’ activities).
158. See supra note 110-116 and accompanying text (explaining the variations in the
numbers of surrogate births reported).
159. See, e.g., Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 6, at 22 (describing literature on sur-
rogacy and noting that it includes “moral, legal, and psychological implications” as well
as “social aspects”).
160. For a more in-depth discussion on this topic, see Bridget J. Crawford, Taxing
Surrogacy, in CHALLENGING GENDER INEQUALITY IN FISCAL POLICY MAKING: COMPARATIVE
RESEARCH ON TAXATION (Åsa Gunnerson et al. eds., forthcoming 2010), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1422180.
161. One surrogate asked a financial advisor, “I served as a surrogate carrier in 2004
and gave birth earlier this year. . . . Do I have to report my compensation?” She also said,
“I do feel I shouldn’t have to pay taxes for being compensated for helping a couple to
have a baby. What about all the needles, sticks, stretch marks and pain/suffering I went
through?” Do Surrogate Moms Have to Pay Income Tax?, Question from “Alcia,” to George
Saenz, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/itax/tax_adviser/20050524a1.asp) (May 24, 2005)
[hereinafter Question from Alcia].
162. “I believe that most of the places that do [send to surrogates the income tax
Form] 1099 think of us as ‘independent contractors’ of which we are NOT!” Posting of
SusanFrmLA to SMO Message Boards, http://www.surromomsonline.com/support/show
thread.php?p=1604396) (Dec. 29, 2008, 03:38 EST) [hereinafter Posting of SusanFrmLA].
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(3) not all surrogacy agencies issue the appropriate tax forms that
would prompt the surrogates to comply with their income tax report-
ing obligations.163 Ordinarily, a business issues to a service provider
or contractor who is not an employee a Form 1099-MISC.164 Thus a
surrogacy agency in the business of matching, supporting, and pay-
ing surrogates should issue a Form 1099 to any surrogate it pays in
a given taxable year.165 Because many agencies do not,166 however,
women who otherwise would report their income may not be aware
that they are required to do so. Furthermore, it does not seem that
the IRS has ever audited a taxpayer who failed to report income from
surrogacy (or at least there are no cases or rulings to suggest so).
Indeed the IRS has not made any public statement that payment
received by a surrogate is income, although there is every indication
that it is. When a surrogacy agency does not issue a Form 1099, it is
reasonable to hypothesize that compliance levels will be low.
I have suggested elsewhere that the IRS should remedy this
situation by issuing guidance regarding the taxability of surrogacy
payments and the obligation of surrogacy agencies to issue Forms
1099-MISC to surrogates.167 This is a straightforward solution to a
compliance problem; it requires little expenditure of resources by the
government, the surrogacy agencies, or the surrogates themselves.
If the government makes a clear statement, the agencies will adjust
their practices and taxpayers will know to report their income.
Consider the possibility of an alternative compliance system,
one located primarily in the other party (or parties) to the surrogacy
arrangement — namely, the intended parent or parents. Such a sys-
tem might have one or more forms. In one iteration, the surrogate
would provide her social security number to the intended parents.
The intended parents would then issue a payment statement to the
surrogate. A Form 1099-MISC would not be appropriate in such a
case, because the intended parents are not in the business of surro-
gacy,168 but the IRS could choose to adapt the form for this purpose
163. Id. (reporting that six out of eighteen agencies mentioned by surrogates do issue
Form 1099s; twelve out of eighteen do not).
164. Form 1099-MISC is a payor’s statement for amounts paid for services performed
for a trade or business by people not treated as its employees or rent or royalty payments.
Internal Revenue Service, Dep’t of the Treasury, Instructions for Form 1099-MISC 1 (2008)
[hereinafter Instructions for Form 1099-MISC] (explaining how to properly report miscel-
laneous income that qualifies for this form); see also Internal Revenue Service, Dep’t of
the Treasury, Form 1099-MISC (2008) [hereinafter Form 1099-MISC].
165. Crawford, supra note 160.
166. See Posting of SusanFrmLA, supra note 162 (reporting surrogacy agencies that
do not issue Form 1099-MISC).
167. Crawford, supra note 160.
168. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (explaining when to report trade or
business payments).
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or create a new form. Alternatively, the surrogate could prepare for
the intended parents a form similar to Form W-4, the Employee’s
Withholding Allowance Certificate.169 The intended parents then
would be responsible for withholding the income taxes on the pay-
ment to the surrogate. From an administrative perspective, these
proposals are not especially complex or difficult to implement. The
next Part considers whether there may be valid theoretical or legal
objections to enforcing a surrogacy tax.
IV. TAXATION, PREGNANCY, AND PRIVACY
A. What Privacy Is
“Privacy” has different meanings, depending on the context.170
One way of understanding privacy is as a right to keep information
from others, either because one has no obligation to disclose or be-
cause one can prevent another from disclosing it to third parties.171
For example, a person has no legal obligation to make public his blood
type.172 A patient can prevent a doctor from disclosing to the patient’s
spouse whether the doctor prescribes anti-depressants for him.173 This
informational understanding of privacy undergirds several important
health-related regulations in the United States and abroad.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA)174 and related legislation include several restrictions on the
use and disclosure in the United States of “protected health infor-
mation,” such as a patient’s name, address, image, medical record
or “[a]ny other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code.”175
HIPAA’s privacy rule176 requires health care providers to obtain
authorization from patients before releasing any protected health
169. Internal Revenue Service, Dep’t of the Treasury, Form W-4 (2008).
170. On the complex meanings of privacy, see, for example, Response, Ann Bartow, A
Feeling of Unease About Privacy Law, 154 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 52, 53 (2006),
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/11-2006/Bartow.pdf.
171. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1002 (8th ed. 2004) (defining privacy law as “[t]he
area of legal studies dealing with a person’s right to be left alone and with restricting
public access to personal information such as tax returns and medical records”).
172. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(a), 164.512(f)(2) (2008) (disallowing disclosure of protected
health information except as permitted, and allowing blood type to be disclosed to law
enforcement only when the law enforcement official’s request meets certain criteria).
173. See id. § 164.508(a) (prohibiting disclosure without authorization).
174. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29 & 42 U.S.C.).
175. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2008).
176. Id. § 164.508(a).
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information (although there are exceptions for “health oversight”
and other narrowly-drawn scenarios).177
Another information-based privacy law is the European Union’s
Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data.178 That Directive contains specific rules for the treatment of
“any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person.”179 Each member nation of the E.U. must adopt laws that
limit the “collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission,
dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combi-
nation, blocking, erasure or destruction”180 of such information. For
any of these actions (or processes) to occur, the data subject must have
“unambiguously” consented and the processing must be “necessary”
for compliance with the law, compliance with contractual terms, or to
achieve a legitimate state interest.181 The E.U. Directive and HIPAA
both articulate privacy as an individual’s right to expect that her per-
sonal information will not be used without her consent.182
Privacy can be understood not only as a right to keep information
to oneself or to prevent others from disclosing it, but also as a broader
right to be left alone, free from interference by others.183 Thoughts,
feelings, and religious affiliation are traditionally private matters —
those into which the state may not interfere.184 As Caitlin Borgmann
177. See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans, Congress’ New Infrastructural Model of Medical Privacy,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 597 n.73 (2009) (discussing the health-oversight exception
to HIPAA’s privacy rule); Michael D. Greenberg & M. Susan Ridgely, Patient Identifiers
and the National Health Information Network: Debunking a False Front in the Privacy
Wars, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 31, 31 n.2 (2008) (noting that one Congressional purpose
of HIPAA was creating “standards for privacy and security of health information”).
178. Council Directive 95/46, The Protection of Individuals With Regard to the
Processing of Personal Date and Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
179. Id. art. 2(a).
180. Id. arts. 2(b), 5.
181. Id. art. 7. For a discussion of the differences between the approaches of the United
States and the European Union to data protection, see Horace E. Anderson, Jr., The
Privacy Gambit: Toward a Game Theoretic Approach to International Data Protection,
9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 16 (2006) (discussing how the two “have traditionally held
starkly different positions on data privacy, including the appropriateness of government
regulation of the collection and use of personal information by the private sector”).
182. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 178, at art. 7; 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2002).
183. See Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy a Woman?, 97 GEO. L.J. 485, 487 (2009) (“[F]reedom
from unreasonable government intrusion into the home, of course, lies at the core of the
Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of privacy.”).
184. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (“[T]he Constitution decrees
that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions
of private choice . . . .”); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
205 (1890) (“[T]he protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed
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explains, the United States Supreme Court recognized a married
couple’s privacy right in the decision to use contraceptives in Griswold
v. Connecticut in 1965.185 The Court held that a “zone of privacy [is]
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees” which pro-
tect such decisions in the marital context.186 In 1972, in Eisenstadt v.
Baird, the Supreme Court extended that right of privacy to “the indi-
vidual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the deci-
sion whether to bear or beget a child.”187 More than thirty years later,
the Supreme Court struck down a Texas sodomy law in Lawrence v.
Texas,188 overruling its 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.189 The
Lawrence Court reasoned that a state prohibition on sodomy violates
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution:
The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual con-
sent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for
their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives
them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention
of the government.190
In other words, the conduct in question in Lawrence was so personal
and private that the Constitution prohibits state interference.191 The
Court held that the state law “further[ed] no legitimate state interest
which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of
the individual.”192 In the context of these three Supreme Court cases,
privacy means something different than what it means under HIPAA
or the E.U. Directive.193 In these cases, privacy is a freedom from
through the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in preventing
publication, is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the
individual to be let alone.”).
185. Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard, and the Evisceration
of Women’s Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 293 (2010); see also Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
186. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
187. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
188. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
189. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that the existing sodomy laws in twenty-five
states were valid).
190. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See supra notes 173-83 and accompanying text (discussing HIPAA’s and the E.U.
Council Directive’s interpretations of privacy).
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state interference or involvement in personal conduct.194 The gov-
ernment cannot constitutionally regulate decisions and acts that are
sufficiently “personal and private.”195
B. Privacy Objections to Taxing Surrogacy
With this understanding of privacy’s dual meanings, consider two
possible lines of privacy-based objections to enforcing a surrogacy tax.
First, do surrogates have a privacy interest in the information that
they received payments for carrying a child for another? Second, is
there is a legitimate state interest in requiring surrogates to report
their income? Rephrased, does an income tax reporting requirement
infringe upon either a surrogate’s right to confidentiality or her con-
stitutional right to privacy, as envisioned by Griswold,196 Eisenstadt197
and Lawrence?198
1. Right to Keep Tax Information to Oneself
To evaluate whether a surrogate might have a privacy right in
the fact of her receipt of taxable income, consider a market-based
analogy. Assume that a company that is in the business of painting
houses hires additional laborers to meet the summer demand for
house painting services. The company hires Person A to work for
twelve weeks as an independent contractor and pays him more than
$600. Guidance from the IRS and the courts make it clear that the
house painting company must issue to Person A Form 1099-MISC, a
statement of amounts paid to an independent contractor.199 Person A
in turn must report that income to the IRS.200 Neither the company
194. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (stating that the government cannot interfere with
an individual’s sexual conduct inside the home); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (finding that
individuals, single or married, are free from government interference when deciding
whether to purchase contraceptives); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (holding that the govern-
ment cannot interfere with a married couple’s decision to purchase contraceptives).
195. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
196. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
197. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
198. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
199. See I.R.C. § 6401(a) (2009) (requiring those engaged in a trade or business to
issue a form for all payments of $600 or more); see also Vaughn v. Comm’r, 63 T.C.M.
(CCH) 3094, 3095 (noting the requirement “to issue a Form 1099-MISC to a nonemployee
payee . . . regarding remuneration for services in excess of $600”); Instructions for Form
1099-MISC, supra note 164 (stating that the form must be filed for “other income
payments” over $600).
200. See I.R.C. § 6012(a)(1)(A) (2009) (requiring income tax returns to be filed by
“every individual having for the taxable year gross income which equals or exceeds the
exemption amount . . .”).
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nor Person A has a colorable privacy claim that is superior to the
income tax reporting requirement.201
The Privacy Act of 1974 prohibits the IRS, as an agency of the
federal government,202 from disclosing its records except in limited
circumstances.203 An agency of the federal government, the IRS must
keep strict account of all disclosures it makes.204 Furthermore, the
201. See infra notes 215-24 and accompanying text (discussing various unsuccessful
privacy challenges to the requirement to file taxes).
202. For purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act, a federal “agency” is an
“authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject
to review by another agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2006).
203. Specifically:
(b) CONDITIONS OF DISCLOSURE.—No agency shall disclose any record which
is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any
person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with
the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains,
unless disclosure of the record would be—
(1) to those officers and employees of the agency which maintains the
record who have a need for the record in the performance of their duties;
(2) required under section 552 of this title;
(3) for a routine use as defined in subsection (a)(7) of this section and
described under subsection (e)(4)(D) of this section;
(4) to the Bureau of the Census for purposes of planning or carrying out
a census or survey or related activity pursuant to the provisions of title 13;
(5) to a recipient who has provided the agency with advance adequate
written assurance that the record will be used solely as a statistical research
or reporting record, and the record is to be transferred in a form that is not
individually identifiable;
(6) to the National Archives and Records Administration as a record which
has sufficient historical or other value to warrant its continued preservation
by the United States Government, or for evaluation by the Archivist of the
United States or the designee of the Archivist to determine whether the
record has such value;
(7) to another agency or to an instrumentality of any governmental juris-
diction within or under the control of the United States for a civil or criminal
law enforcement activity if the activity is authorized by law, and if the head
of the agency or instrumentality has made a written request to the agency
which maintains the record specifying the particular portion desired and the
law enforcement activity for which the record is sought;
(8) to a person pursuant to a showing of compelling circumstances affecting
the health or safety of an individual if upon such disclosure notification is
transmitted to the last known address of such individual;
(9) to either House of Congress, or, to the extent of matter within its
jurisdiction, any committee or subcommittee thereof, any joint committee
of Congress or subcommittee of any such joint committee;
(10) to the Comptroller General, or any of his authorized representa-
tives, in the course of the performance of the duties of the Government
Accountability Office;
(11) pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction; or
(12) to a consumer reporting agency in accordance with section 3711(e) of
title 31.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2006).
204. Id. § 552a(c).
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Internal Revenue Code itself prohibits agency disclosure of certain
information.205 Tax returns are confidential; government employees
are prohibited from disclosing “any return or return information
obtained by him in any manner in connection with his service as
such an officer or an employee or otherwise . . . ,” subject to narrow
exceptions.206
In spite of these legal protections, taxpayers’ confidence in the
confidentiality of their tax data suffers with each additional report of
a breach to IRS security.207 In 1995, for example, a former IRS em-
ployee was indicted for illegally obtaining information on a candidate
for national political office.208 In 1997, someone at the IRS allegedly
leaked the tax records of Paula Jones, the plaintiff in a sexual harass-
ment lawsuit against then-President Bill Clinton.209 As recently as
January 2009, Congress’s Government Accountability Office (GAO)
reported that the IRS’s “information security control weaknesses con-
tinue to jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
financial and sensitive taxpayer information.” 210 Specifically, the
GAO faulted the IRS for failing to maintain strong passwords on
electronic files, restrict access to files and encrypt data.211 The GAO
further stated that, “Until these weaknesses are corrected, the agency
remains particularly vulnerable to insider threats and IRS is at in-
creased risk of unauthorized access to and disclosure, modification,
or destruction of financial and taxpayer information, as well as inad-
vertent or deliberate disruption of system operations and services.” 212
205. I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2009).
206. Id. For a thorough analysis of administrative law and its application to the IRS,
see MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 1.03 (rev. 2d ed. 2002) (discuss-
ing the sections of the Administrative Procedure Act that apply to the IRS).
207. IRS Waives Red Flag on Request for Consumer Information, 7 CONSUMER FIN.
SERVICES L. REP. (2004) (“The Internal Revenue Service shot an arrow through the heart
of public confidence in the government’s role in protecting consumer financial privacy.”).
208. Judy Rakowsky, Ex-IRS Worker Indicted Allegedly “Browsed” Data for Candidate’s
Records, BOSTON GLOBE, June 3, 1995, at 13.
209. See Carl Limbacher, IRS Official to Judicial Watch: Clinton Enemies Were Audited,
NEWSMAX.COM, Apr. 23, 2002, http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/4/22/
200136.shtml (“The [Paula] Jones case, which would eventually lead to [President Bill]
Clinton’s impeachment, was of particular interest to the IRS, which apparently leaked her
confidential tax returns to the late New York Daily News reporter Lars Erik Nelson.”).
210. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION SECURITY: CONTINUED EFFORTS
NEEDED TO ADDRESS SIGNIFICANT WEAKNESSES AT IRS 2 (2009), available at http://www
.gao.gov/new.items/d09136.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. The GAO issued a similar
report in 2008. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION SECURITY: IRS NEEDS
TO ADDRESS PERVASIVE WEAKNESSES 2-3 (2008) (discussing the weaknesses in security
controls at the IRS).
211. GAO REPORT, supra note 210, at 2.
212. Id. at 3.
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It seems, therefore, that no amount of legal protection can guarantee
the privacy of tax information.
Even though there are real privacy risks to taxpayers’ confiden-
tial information, the government has consistently rejected the claim
that tax compliance — reporting one’s income to the government in
accordance with the IRS rules and regulations — violates a citizen’s
constitutional rights.213 The IRS labels as “frivolous” the claim that
the tax law, including mandatory self-reporting, “invades a taxpayer’s
right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment.” 214 The United States
Supreme Court also has rejected this claim,215 and yet taxpayers con-
tinue to raise it.216 Klunder v. United States is typical in this regard.217
For two separate years, the taxpayer in Klunder filed incomplete in-
come tax returns.218 He filled in his name, address, signature and the
amount of tax he believed he owed, but he left the rest of the form
blank.219 After the IRS assessed and Mr. Klunder paid penalties for
filing frivolous returns, Mr. Klunder sought a refund.220 He argued
that he had a privacy right in information about his income and that
imposing a penalty on him for failing to disclose that information vio-
lated his Fourth Amendment right to privacy.221 The United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington granted sum-
mary judgment to the government, soundly rejecting the taxpayer’s
constitutional claim:
Our complex and comprehensive system of federal taxation, rely-
ing as it does upon self-assessment and reporting, demands that
all taxpayers be forthright in the disclosure of relevant information
to the taxing authorities. Without such disclosure, and the concom-
itant power of the Government to compel disclosure, our national
tax burden would not be fairly and equitably distributed.222
213. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263-64 (1927) (holding that it
does not violate the Fifth Amendment to mandate filing taxes).
214. I.R.S. Notice 2007-30, 2007-1 C.B. 883, 885.
215. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973).
216. See, e.g., Pryor v. United States, No. 88-z-183, 1990 WL 61972, at *2 (D. Colo.
Mar. 14, 1990) (“[P]laintiffs’ [sic] have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their
returns”); Wainwright v. United States, No. 83-2466, 1984 WL 261, at *1 (W.D.La.
Apr. 3, 1984) (rejecting a Fourth Amendment claim as “frivolous”).
217. Klunder v. United States, No. C99-542R, 2000 WL 555963, at *1 (W.D. Wash.
Feb. 25, 2000).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. The taxpayer’s complaint alleged that “ ‘a mere request for information by a
governmental agency, without probable cause, is insufficient to require production of
that information.’ ” Id.
222. Id. at *2-3.
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Courts routinely reject claims to Fourth Amendment privacy in
one’s tax data,223 or even a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.224
With this background, it is clear that neither the house painting
company nor Person A in the earlier example can avoid tax disclo-
sure on constitutional grounds. If Person A (the house painter and
an independent contractor) must disclose his financial dealings to
the IRS, it is highly unlikely that a surrogate would be treated any
differently. Just as the house painting company pays Person A, a
surrogacy agency pays a surrogate.225 The agency is in the business
of brokering surrogacy agreements and relationships.226 Thus the
agency has an obligation to issue Form 1099-MISC to any surrogate
it pays more than $600.227 Anecdotal information suggests that not
all surrogacy agencies meet this obligation, however.228 In the case
of a privately arranged surrogacy, without the assistance of an
agency, intended parents may pay the surrogate directly.229 In that
case, the intended parents would not issue Form 1099-MISC to the
surrogate, as the intended parents are not engaged in the trade or
business of surrogacy.230
223. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (noting that taxpayers continue to
raise claims asserting that tax compliance violates their constitutional right to privacy).
224. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment claim failed where “there exists no legitimate expectation of privacy and no
semblance of governmental compulsion against the accused”); Ricket v. Comm’r, 773 F.2d
1214, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the Fifth Amendment claim was “frivolous”);
Edwards v. Comm’r, 680 F.2d 1268, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 1982) (same).
225. See, e.g., Find a Surrogate Mother: Surrogacy Agency Program, Surrogate Mother
Compensation Schedule, http://www.thesurrogacysource.com/sg_compensation.htm (last
visited Oct. 6, 2009) (outlining a compensation scheme for surrogate mothers).
226. See National Surrogacy Clinic, The Surrogacy SOURCE: For Intended Parents,
http://www.thesurrogacysource.com/ip_about.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2009) (describing
the maintenance of the relationship between the agency and the surrogate and the relation-
ship between the intended parents and the surrogate).
227. See I.R.C. § 6041(a) (2009) (requiring those engaged in a trade or business to issue
a return for all payments of $600 or more).
228. Posting of SusanFrmLA, supra note 162. This same commenter added that
“MOST of the large agencies have been in business for some time and know the industry
DO NOT 1099. They are in business and what their clients/surrogates do is not their
business.” Posting of proudmomnsurro to SMO Message Boards, http://www
.surromomsonline.com/support/showthread.php?p=1592863 (Dec. 28, 2008, 23:17 EST)
(quoting SusanFrmLA). Of the eighteen agencies mentioned in this discussion thread, six
reportedly issue Form-1099 and twelve do not. Posting of SusanFrmLA, supra note 162.
229. See Surrogate Motherhood: Private vs. Agency-Facilitated Arrangements, http://
surrogate-motherhood.org/content/surrogate-motherhood-private-vs-agency-facilitated
-arrangements (last visited Oct. 8, 2009) (discussing the pros and cons of private surrogacy
versus agency-facilitated surrogacy).
230. See Internal Revenue Service, Dep’t of the Treasury, Instructions for Form 1099-
MISC 1 (2009) (“Report on Form 1099-MISC only when payments are made in the course
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Notwithstanding the current law, might there be something
about surrogacy that makes it different enough from house painting
that it is more susceptible to a constitutional claim to privacy? If one’s
primary intellectual commitment is to treating reproductive labor
identically to other types of labor, then surrogacy should be treated
no differently from house painting. Neither the surrogate nor the
house painter, each of whom engages in paid work, has a constitu-
tional right to keep from the IRS any information about the tax-
payer’s earnings.231 Like house painting, surrogacy–and indeed all
employment–involves a choice about the use to which one will put
one’s own body.232 But to take this position is to ignore the social and
cultural reality that, in the estimation of many reasonable people,
surrogacy is not just another form of employment.233 Rather, it is an
arrangement with deep moral implications.234 Participating in a sur-
rogacy arrangement, whether as an egg donor, intended parent, ges-
tational carrier, or representative of a surrogacy agency, may invite
scrutiny from one’s friends, family, or community.235
2. The Right to Choose to be a Surrogate
Consider, then, whether the obligation to disclose income from
surrogacy violates privacy in the second sense: the freedom to make
choices about private and personal conduct free from state interference
or involvement. The decision to enter into a surrogacy arrangement
is a choice about the uses to which one will put one’s own reproduc-
tive capacity as well as the reproductive capacity of at least one other
of your trade or business. Personal payments are not reportable. You are engaged in a
trade or business if you operate for gain or profit.”).
231. See supra notes 214-24 and accompanying text (arguing that the government has
never accepted a constitutional right to privacy when it comes to tax).
232. Martha C. Nussbaum, “Whether From Reason or Prejudice”: Taking Money for
Bodily Services, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 693, 693-94 (1998) (“All of us with the exception of the
independently wealthy and the un-employed take money for the use of our body.”).
233. See, e.g., Ragoné, The Gift of Life, supra note 103, at 213 (discussing  women who
testified compensation was not their only motivation for becoming a surrogate).
234. Lisa Sowle Cahill, The Ethics of Surrogate Motherhood: Biology, Freedom, and
Moral Obligation, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY 152-53 (Larry
Gostin ed., 1990) (analyzing the “moral ramifications of surrogate motherhood” by focus-
ing on the “moral status of decisions . . . to conceive a child one does not intend to raise,
or to induce another to do so; and . . . to enter into a reproductive relationship with an
individual who one has no significant and enduring interpersonal relationship . . .”).
235. See, e.g., Ragoné, The Gift of Life, supra note 103, at 213 (quoting one surrogate
whose family was actively opposed to her acting as a surrogate); Thomas C. Shevory,
Rethinking Public and Private Life via the Surrogacy Contract, 8 POL. & LIFE SCI. 173,
182 (1990) (indicating that the Catholic Church and many conservatives are opposed to
assisted reproductive technologies).
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person.236 It is a decision about how to “bear or beget a child,” a deci-
sion “so fundamentally affecting a person” that the government may
not intrude on it, as the Eisenstadt court established.237 So does a tax
requirement to report income from surrogacy rise to the level of a
constitutional violation? It almost certainly does not.238
In analogous contexts, the income tax law requires disclosure
of extremely private facts, without legally offending taxpayers’ pri-
vacy rights. For example, details about an abortion must be reported
to the IRS in order to claim a medical deduction for associated ex-
penses.239 Any claimed medical deduction must be supported by evi-
dence.240 This requirement, the United States Tax Court has ruled,
in no way infringes on a taxpayer’s privacy.241 Deductions are a mat-
ter of “‘legislative grace,’ ” 242 and so, too, are exemptions from tax
reporting requirements.243 Thus it is unlikely that a surrogate could
raise a successful claim that a legal requirement to report income
violates her right to privacy.
Critics of the surrogacy tax may argue that, putting privacy
concerns aside, surrogacy is so unique that the government should
play no role in it.244 The New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Baby M
236. See Cahill, supra note 234, at 152-63 (discussing the issues that may emerge from
entering into a reproductive relationship with another individual who is not a spouse
and who does not intend to raise the child).
237. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
238. See discussion infra notes 244-246 and accompanying text (discussing the role of
privacy in taxation of income from surrogacy).
239. See Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(h) (2009) (“Claims for deductions must be substantiated,
when requested by the district director, by a statement or itemized invoice from the indi-
vidual or entity to which payment for medical expenses was made showing the nature of
the service rendered, and to or for whom rendered; the nature of any other item of expense
and for whom incurred and for what specific purpose, the amount paid therefor and the
date of the payment thereof; and by such other information as the district director may
deem necessary.”). See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUBL’N 502,
MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES 5 (2008) (including abortion costs on the list of expendi-
tures that count toward medical expense deduction).
240. Gasparutti v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 726, 728 (1998).
241. Id. (denying deduction where taxpayer “did not wish to provide any documents
regarding his medical condition because it is an invasion of his privacy”).
242. See, e.g., Langer v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2008-255, 2008 WL 4876819 at *2 (U.S.
Tax Ct.) (“ ‘[A] taxpayer seeking a deduction must be able to point to an applicable statute
and show that he comes within its terms.’ ” (quoting New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering,
292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934))).
243. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2503(a),(b) (2009) (stating that annual gifts under the exclusion
amount are not taxable for gift tax purposes).
244. See Gregory Pence, De-Regulating and De-Criminalizing Innovations in Human
Reproduction, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2008-2009) (arguing that deciding to have a child
“may be a quintessential aspect of personal liberties” and noting that “[p]rior decisions
by the Supreme Court about contraception, informed consent, and abortion, among many
other decisions, imply a respect for an area where governments should not interfere with
individuals’ decisions concerning the creation of families”).
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mused, “In addition to the inevitable confrontation with the ethical
and moral issues involved, there is the question of the wisdom and
effectiveness of regulating a matter so private, yet of such public in-
terest.” 245 Taken to its logical conclusion, this position would require
an income tax exemption not only for the surrogate, but also for the
surrogacy agencies that profit from the arrangements.246 The exemp-
tion theoretically could extend to all people and businesses engaged in
a myriad of commercial activities involving truly unique and personal
decisions: for example, making, selling, and purchasing contracep-
tives or medicines for certain health conditions. Such an exemption,
however, would be administratively and fiscally unwise.
C. Whether Privacy Matters
Anita Allen has argued that “accountability for virtually all
personal and intimate behavior is the rule rather than the exception
in the United States. Accountability for private life is as common as
dirt.” 247 In other words, there exists little “privacy,” in the sense of a
cultural or even moral “right,” to keep information to oneself.248 Even
though a citizen has no generalized legal obligation to disclose her
health-related information,249 in Allen’s analysis, this citizen never-
theless may have a moral duty to share that information with her
husband or life partner.250 Being accountable for health information
(as in yielding privacy through disclosure) allows a physician to bet-
ter care for the patient.251 Such disclosure better equips a spouse or
245. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1264 (N.J. 1988).
246. In a non-tax context, Naomi Cahn and Jennifer Collins argue for increased
oversight of assisted reproductive technologies, including limits on embryo transfers.
Naomi R. Cahn & Jennifer M. Collins, Eight is Enough, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY
501, 513 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/22. Kimberly
Krawiec cautions that such limits “would produce fewer benefits and higher costs than
Cahn and Collins assume. Moreover, the fertility industry is to be subjected to greater
oversight, such oversight should stem from a balancing of what is to be gained and lost
in the process . . . .” Kimberly D. Krawiec, Why We Should Ignore the “Octomom,” 104
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 120, 121 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/
colloquy/2009/34.
247. ANITA L. ALLEN, WHY PRIVACY ISN’T EVERYTHING: FEMINIST REFLECTIONS ON
PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 3 (2003).
248. Id. (“Accountability for private life means that the broad areas of individual and
group life regularly labeled as private are not walled off.”).
249. Id. at 120 (“Individuals have exclusive access to many forms of information about
their own physical and mental states. They may elect to keep this kind of information
to themselves.”).
250. Id. at 122 (“It is important to share health information with family and friends
to reap the rewards of reciprocal love, trust, and interdependency.”).
251. Id. at 119 (“The ability of patients to trust their doctors with the truth depends
on their expectations of physician competence and confidentiality. Patient openness is
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partner to recognize signs of illness or perhaps even to determine the
appropriateness of certain interventions.252 Allen’s theories, as applied
to the surrogacy context, suggest that surrogacy tax itself is not an in-
trusion on privacy. Any “harm” the surrogacy tax does is to the nar-
rative of altruism that surrogates and intended parents embrace.253
1. Women and Privacy
Women have a mixed experience with privacy. Privacy, in the
sense of being left alone, is the condition under which domestic vio-
lence flourishes, free from state intervention.254 Privacy, however,
also is the theoretical ground on which women assert the right to con-
trol their own bodies.255 Instead of drawing broad conclusions about
privacy, then, Allen calls for a “context-specific” analysis of account-
ability for private life.256 She reasons that “certain goals, including
moral dignity and autonomy, inclusive workplaces, public safety, effec-
tive leadership, happy families, and a pluralistic society, will point
us away from certain specific accountability practices and toward
others.” 257 Thus, accountability for our so-called “private” lives comes
in many forms: “(1) reporting, (2) explaining, and (3) justifying acts
and omissions [as well as] (4) submit[ting] to sanctions and (5) main-
tain[ing] reliable patterns of behavior.” 258 Although taxation does not
factor explicitly into Allen’s analysis, it is an accountability of the
form that Allen identifies. Surrogacy tax is a requirement to report
to the government the money that changes hands in an otherwise
“private” transaction.259
How is this type of tax reporting justifiable? A system that re-
quires a taxpayer to report income from surrogacy marks the eco-
nomic value of reproductive work.260 A surrogate’s paying taxes on
this work means that it will inure to her future financial benefit, inso-
especially critical in the delivery of mental health services. In addition to physician-patient
confidentiality facilitating health-relevant disclosures, it also promotes individual interests
in autonomy.”).
252. Id. at 121-22.
253. See infra notes 270-78 and accompanying text (discussing altruism).
254. ALLEN, supra note 247, at 42.
255. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 926-27 (1992) (noting
the “principle that personal decisions that profoundly affect bodily integrity, identity, and
destiny should be largely beyond the reach of the government”).
256. ALLEN, supra note 247, at 42.
257. Id. at 44.
258. Id. at 15.
259. See Crawford, supra note 160 (discussing the controversy around and difficulties
with reporting surrogacy in tax documents).
260. See id. (framing surrogacy as “activities . . . of work . . . for which [the surrogate]
deserves to be compensated”).
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far as social security benefits, among others, are based on the length
of time the individual has engaged in paid, market-based labor.261
Taxation also makes reproductive work more like traditional market-
based work: work that is subject to a myriad of local, state, and federal
regulations.262 Taxation, therefore, can be understood as an account-
ability practice that “protects, dignifies, and advantages,” in Allen’s
lexicon.263 Taxation holds surrogates accountable for their choice,
thereby “presupposing intelligence, rationality, and competence for
dialogic social performances of reckoning,” 264 conferring a high degree
of dignity on the person who performs the work.
A business income payor, such as a surrogacy agency, makes itself
accountable for standard business practices by issuing Form 1099-
MISC.265 An agency that complies with its administrative obligations
under the tax law likely employs experts and specialists who can mon-
itor compliance with other local, state and federal regulations, too.
The fact that surrogates are women, and that only women will
pay a surrogacy tax, does not offend equality under Allen’s frame-
work. She makes room for treating men and women differently as
long as that difference is linked to women’s actual capabilities.266
Allen states, “Equality of accountability will also require that when
men and women engage in the same activities, women are neither
more nor less accountable than male counterparts.” 267 Differential
treatment between men and women is not per se inappropriate when
it is based on biology.268 Thus, a surrogacy tax is not an inappropriate
form of accountability for private life.
2. Bursting the Bubble of Altruism
Requiring surrogates to account to the government via the tax
system weakens the narrative that surrogates are wholly altruistic
actors. If that narrative weakens too much, social and perhaps even
261. See id. at 7.
262. See, e.g., 1 DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION WORKPLACE § 11:6 (2009) (pointing out that
employers must comply with various anti-discrimination laws).
263. ALLEN, supra note 247, at 195.
264. Id. at 196.
265. Form 1099-MISC, supra note 164 (requiring individuals and companies to report
payments for non-employee services of more than $600).
266. ALLEN, supra note at 247, at 41 (“Equality of accountability cannot mean, though,
that without regard to actual capacities and roles, individual men and women should be
accountable in precisely the same ways to precisely the same people.”).
267. Id.
268. Id. (“The criminal or civil accountability that might be appropriate for a nursing
mother who knowingly consumes dangerous drugs that will be delivered to her infant
through breast milk is not appropriate for the father of the infant who consumes those
same drugs.”).
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legal tolerance of surrogacy may, too.269 Surrogates report that their
motives often are not financial, or at least not financial in the first
instance.270 As one surrogate explained, “The money wasn’t enough
to be pregnant for nine months.” 271 Another said, “I’m not doing it for
the money. Take the money. That wouldn’t stop me. It wouldn’t stop
the majority.” 272 A third asked, “What’s $10,000 bucks? You can’t
even buy a car . . . Money wasn’t important. I possibly would have
done it just for expenses, especially for the people I did it for. My
father would have given me the money not to do it.” 273 De-emphasiz-
ing the financial aspects of surrogacy contributes to the construction
of surrogacy as the “ ‘gift of life,’ ” 274 a supreme self-sacrifice.275 Fram-
ing surrogacy — whether traditional or gestational — in this way con-
tributes to a positive view of surrogates, like blood or organ donors.276
Indeed, one factor in Mary Beth Whitehead’s success in the In re
Baby M case may have been her lawyers’ portrayal, and the Supreme
Court of New Jersey’s acceptance, of her as a woman whose desire
to be a surrogate “resulted from her sympathy with family members
and others who could have no children (she stated that she wanted
to give another couple the ‘gift of life’); she also wanted the $10,000 to
help her family.” 277 From this perspective, Mrs. Whitehead’s altru-
ism was primary; her financial motives were secondary.278
Constructing surrogacy as a gift reinforces the dichotomy be-
tween the family/private sphere and the commercial/public sphere.279
Bringing a child into the world typically is associated with love,
affection, and the family.280 Purchasing services or a product is associ
269. SUSAN MARKENS, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD AND THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION
182 (2003) (“[N]ew reproductive technologies are more likely to be permitted and tolerated
when they are associated with acts of reproduction rather than with acts of consumption.
That is, although we live in a consumer-oriented culture . . . as a society we remain
averse to equating kinship formations with commercial transactions.”).
270. See Ragoné, The Gift of Life, supra note 103, at 212.
271. Id. at 213.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 210.
275. See id. at 214-15 (referring to surrogacy as “the ultimate gift of love” and framing
surrogacy as a relationship of indebtedness to the woman’s sacrifice).
276. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the positive view of organ
and blood donors).
277. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1236 (N.J. 1988).
278. See MARKENS, supra note 269, at 120-21 (contrasting In re Baby M with Johnson
v. Calvert, where the surrogate was portrayed in the press as a welfare abuser who
demanded more money from intended parents in return for relinquishing the child).
279. “[T]he rejection of paid or commercial surrogacy may . . . result from a cultural
resistance to conflating the symbolic value of the family with the world of work to which
it has long been held in opposition.” Ragoné, The Gift of Life, supra note 103, at 215.
280. D. Langdridge et al., Understanding the Reasons for Parenthood, 23 J. REPROD. &
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ated with greed, need, consumption, and the market economy.281 To
focus on the money that changes hands in the surrogacy context is
to suggest that the family and the marketplace are not as distinct
as one may think.282
The ideology of altruism historically has obscured the underly-
ing reality of women’s work.283 Scholars have exposed, for example,
the ways that working women who employ in-home child-care pro-
viders, as well as care-providers themselves, become invested in a
narrative of the giving, loving nanny.284 Care providers may focus
their love for their own absent children to the children in their im-
mediate care,285 allowing the employer-mother to feel less guilty about
her own physical absence from them.286 But as Taunya Lovell Banks
has explained, even the names used to describe care providers —
“babysitters” and “nannies” — can obscure the power dynamics of
the employer-employee relationship.287 In other words, to describe
INFANT PSYCHOL. 121, 131 (2005) (noting “a number of reasons . . . in predicting intentions
to have a child” including “giv[ing] love and mak[ing] a family”).
281. Katherine Franke invites reconsideration of this dichotomy: “To portray mothering
as purely altruistic, other-regarding, and socially valuable, and [market consumption] as
purely selfish and socially inconsequential, is to ignore the complex interrelations
between production, reproduction, and consumption, as well as the social forces that gov-
ern the ‘choices’ and priorities we set in our own lives.” Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing
Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 190-91 (2001).
282. See Rhonda Shaw, Rethinking Reproductive Gifts as Body Projects, 42 SOC. 11,
16 (2008) (finding that non-commercial surrogacy is emphasized as altruistic because
money is not exchanged).
283. See Deborah Stone, For Love nor Money: The Commodification of Care, in
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE 271, 278
(Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) (suggesting that the desire of some
care workers to be seen as loving providers makes them vulnerable to exploitation); see
also Reva B. Siegel, Home As Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’
Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1133 (1994) (recounting the idealized
view of a wife’s labor in the home in the nineteenth century); Katharine Silbaugh, Turning
Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 23 (1997) (explaining that
in the nineteenth century, “[t]he market was understood as cold, competitive, male, and
aggressively self-interested, while the family was understood as a haven for altruism,
affection, higher moral calling, and refuge from the market world”).
284. Arlie Russell Hochschild, Love and Gold, in GLOBAL WOMAN: NANNIES, MAIDS,
AND SEX WORKERS IN THE NEW ECONOMY 15, 26 (Barbara Ehrenreich & Arlie Russell
Hochschild eds., 2002) (describing how wealthy employers of child-care providers focus
on mutual love between child and care-provider and stating: “[T]hat’s all there is to it.
The nanny’s love is a thing in itself. It is unique, private — fetishized”); Cameron L.
Macdonald, Manufacturing Motherhood: The Shadow Work of Nannies and Au Pairs, 21
QUALITATIVE SOC. 25, 37 (1998) (noting that mother’s “need to feel good about her child
care arrangement can lead [her] to maximize the nanny-child bond” and emphasize how
much her children “ ‘love’ the nanny”).
285. Hochschild, supra note 284, at 25-26.
286. See Macdonald, supra note 284, at 40-41 (describing the guilt absent mothers may
feel, and their belief that their children need attention from some source).
287. Taunya Lovell Banks, Toward a Global Critical Feminist Vision: Domestic Work
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the relationship is to characterize it in a certain way. This is true
with surrogacy.
Taxing surrogacy is a kind of accountability that threatens to
disrupt a narrative not dissimilar to the nanny narrative. A surro-
gate tells herself and others (and very genuinely may believe) that
she is acting as a surrogate in order “to give.” 288 The intended par-
ents want and need to accept this as true, so that they can disengage
from the complexities of surrogacy and assuage any concerns they
might have about asking a woman to relinquish a child to whom she
gives birth.289 If the tax system enforces income tax reporting by sur-
rogates, surrogacy loses its claim to being “not work” and comes to
look more like baby-selling.290
For intended parents, treating surrogacy as work just like any
other might facilitate the view, articulated by one intended father,
that the gestational surrogate is merely an “oven” in which the baby
is created,291 a facility that can be rented for a particular project. There
exists a real tension, then, between accountability in the form of regu-
larized income tax reporting and the potential that a gestational car-
rier will be seen as a worker like any other. Whether women would
prefer surrogacy work to other work might depend on the individual,
but if altruism takes second place to monetary reward in the cultural
story, potential surrogates will be less likely to embrace it.292
Notwithstanding this potential negative side of enforcing a sur-
rogacy tax, extending Anita Allen’s theory of privacy293 allows for
the possibility that surrogacy tax, a form of accountability, is an
appropriate concession for the freedom to choose to be a surrogate.
and the Nanny Tax Debate, 3 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 1, 6 (1999). Banks also argues
that “[n]anny, the term used by affluent professional women, romanticizes and conceals
the exploitative nature of the employer-employee relationship. The term nanny genders
as female, and normalizes surrogate childcare and domestic labor in the private sphere,
reinforcing the notion that men are entitled to women’s domestic labor.” Id. at 4.
288. Philip J. Parker, Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings, 140 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 117, 118 (1983).
289. Katherine Drabiak et al., Ethics, Law, and Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for
Uniformity, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 300, 305 (2007) (explaining how surrogacy agencies
capitalize on the altruism paradigm to attract intended parents).
290. See MARKENS, supra note 269, at 82 (noting critics who “equate . . . commercial
surrogacy with ‘baby-selling’ ” and who have asked “facetiously” if babies would then be
subject to sales tax).
291. One man said of his gestational surrogate, “She was an oven . . . . she doesn’t see
herself as the mother. We don’t see her as the mother and that’s the way it is.” Ragoné,
The Gift of Life, supra note 103, at 218.
292. Id. at 214 (noting that the “gift formulation” idea of surrogacy “holds particular
appeal for surrogates”).
293. See supra notes 247-58 and accompanying text (discussing Anita Allen’s theory
of privacy).
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Allen describes what she calls a “New Accountability,” an escalating
demand for information, as “a product of Americans’ extensive social,
economic, and political freedoms and our ambivalence about forms
of privacy that hide truths useful to others.” 294 These freedoms also
provide a firm basis for accountability. In return for citizens’ ability
to use reproductive technology, the government may enforce the in-
come tax laws that clearly treat a surrogate’s receipts as income.295
V. FORGETTING AND REMEMBERING MOTHERHOOD
If enforcing a surrogacy tax weakens the cultural story of altru-
ism, its supporters need to find other support for the practice. Indeed,
the income tax law is one place to which surrogacy’s supporters might
turn. After all, the Internal Revenue Code is full of provisions that are
designed to encourage some behavior, like homeownership,296 and
discourage other behavior, like drug use.297 There could be special
exemptions for a certain percentage of income from surrogacy, or
deductions or tax credits for associated expenses. Tax law and social
policy are no strangers.298 Offering tax incentives for surrogacy is a
choice society can make in order to increase its appeal.299
Reproductive technology undoubtedly allows many people the
otherwise unattainable experience of forming a family and becoming
a parent.300 And in some ways, reproductive technology and adoption
laws have responded much faster to changes in family structure
than, for example, marriage and divorce laws have.301 The practice
294. ALLEN, supra note 247, at 199.
295. See I.R.C. § 61 (2009) (defining “gross income” to include compensation for services).
296. See id. § 121 (excluding from gross income the gain on the sale of a principal
residence). The income tax law also encourages charitable donations. See id. § 170
(allowing deductions for certain transfers to charity).
297. See id. § 25A(b)(2)(D) (disallowing the Hope Scholarship credit in the case of a
student who has been convicted of a felony or state drug possession or distribution offense).
298. See FRANK SAMMARTINO & ERIC TODER, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, SOCIAL POLICY
AND THE TAX SYSTEM 21 (2002), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310418_TaxSystem
.pdf (“The tax system is being used to achieve some goals of social policy and is likely to
be employed for others.”).
299. See id. (discussing how tax benefits have been used to encourage home ownership,
charitable giving, and retirement saving, among other purposes).
300. J. Barnes et al., The Influence of Assisted Reproduction on Family Functioning
and Children’s Socio-emotional Development: Results from a European Study, 19 HUM.
REPROD. 1480, 1485 (2004) (emphasizing that families formed with the aid of assisted
reproductive technology are as likely to be successful as families conceived naturally).
301. Denise A. Skinner & Julie K. Kohler, Parental Rights in Diverse Family Contexts:
Current Legal Developments, 51 FAM. REL. 293, 293-97 (2002) (outlining the legal devel-
opments in parental rights as family structures have changed, specifically relating to
adoption, assisted reproductive technology, step-parents, and gay- and lesbian-headed
families); cf. Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay
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of surrogacy must be understood, however, as facilitating parenthood
and thus reinforcing the idea that motherhood is the default vocation
for women and that children are the default status for families.302 Sur-
rogacy both creates new possibilities for gay men, to give one example,
to become biological parents,303 but it also shores up traditional gender
roles and expectations.304 It is a medical way of easing the real pain
that childless women (and some men) feel.305 It makes more difficult
the radical reconsideration of the possibilities for human fulfillment.306
In this sense, surrogacy operates as a kind of cultural propranolol.307
Scientists believe that this drug, typically used to treat hypertension,
can recondition certain memory pathways in the brain so that post-
traumatic stress disorder victims and survivors of sexual trauma will
not suffer from flashbacks.308 The use of propranolol has tremendous
appeal; it can alleviate the suffering of many people.309 But opponents
condemn propranolol on the grounds that it deprives the individual
of the moral and ethical enrichment that comes from human suffer-
ing.310 The law, however, should not give cognizance to the notion
that there is inherent virtue in suffering traumatic memories or in
childlessness, for that matter. Ultimately, each person must decide
and Lesbian Families, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1299, 1302 (1997) (discussing gay and lesbian
marriage and stating, “historically, American family law has reflected and reinforced the
traditional nuclear family model”).
302. See Uma Narayan, Family Ties: Rethinking Parental Claims in Light of Surrogacy
and Custody, in HAVING AND RAISING CHILDREN: UNCONVENTIONAL FAMILIES, HARD
CHOICES, AND THE SOCIAL GOOD 65, 70 (Uma Narayan & Julia J. Bartkowiak eds., 1999)
(arguing that commercial surrogacy is linked to gender-role and economic exploitation).
303. Susan Donaldson James, More Gay Men Choose Surrogacy to Have Children,
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for himself or herself how much pain to tolerate. If surrogacy eases
that pain, then it is justified. The government may properly tax the
activity, but it cannot prohibit it.
CONCLUSION
People give, rent and sell body parts for many reasons. Their
motivations may be love, money, publicity, a desire to help, or any
combination of factors.311 Some transfers have permanent and serious
consequences. Consider the Long Island man who donated a kidney
to his wife in 2001 “in a gift meant to save her life and their founder-
ing marriage.” 312 When the marriage deteriorated several years
later, the husband requested during divorce proceedings that the
kidney be treated as a marital asset for purposes of equitable distri-
bution.313 He claimed that the kidney was worth $1.5 million.314 The
Special Referee in the case denied the husband’s request, reasoning
that human organs are not “ ‘marital property’ ” and that the hus-
band “inappropriately equate[d] human organs with commodities.” 315
Human organs may not be commodities for purposes of divorce law,
then, but regenerable body parts like blood and breast milk certainly
are for income tax purposes.316
Tax is not the only area of law that permits (or at least tolerates)
a commercial trade in bodies. Legalized prostitution systematizes
it.317 In jurisdictions like Germany, for example, prostitution is
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to [fifty] percent are minors. The majority of transnational victims are females
2010] TAXATION, PREGNANCY, AND PRIVACY 367
legal.318 In 2009, a woman there sold her virginity to the highest bid-
der on an internet auction site.319 She received $13,827.320 Curiously,
prostitution is legal in Germany, but gestational surrogacy is not.321
Perhaps the long history of selling sex322 makes it seem less offen-
sive than gestational surrogacy, a twentieth century phenomenon.323
Perhaps the state takes a limited role in prostitution because two
adult parties with presumed equal bargaining power are presumed
to have agreed about the uses to which they will put their bodies.324
Surrogacy, on the other hand, involves not just two (or more) con-
senting adults, but also a child — someone who was not party to the
initial contract — and so it merits greater state involvement.325 Yet,
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still, there is no logical reason that state involvement must be an
absolute ban on gestational surrogacy, instead of regulation.
Undoubtedly, surrogacy is a complicated arrangement. It invites
questions about the meaning of “mother,” “father,” and “family.” 326
Surrogacy challenges the belief that women are irrevocably connected
to the children they bear.327 It raises a myriad of ethical questions.
But in an economic sense, surrogacy is rather simple. It is work that
gives rise to taxable income. The mandate for the legal system is
clear: enforce and collect the tax. Of all of the unanswered (and un-
answerable) questions about surrogacy, taxation is not one of them.
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